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Introduction
How should we conceptualize and evaluate the extent and nature of interna-
tional influence, if any, on democratic rule of law (DRoL) developments in
domestic systems? Throughout history, most studies in democratization have
been characterized by a puzzling lack of systematic thinking about these
fundamental questions. From the inception of modern democratization stud-
ies in the 1960s until the end of the Cold War, scholars of democratic transi-
tions and consolidation largely conceived the outcomes of domestic political
processes as being driven by national forces and calculations, at both elite and
mass levels, and were reluctant to venture beyond the demos in search of the
causes of democratization. What was true of studies regarding the develop-
ment of democracy reflected a broader malaise in which research into inter-
national impact on domestic change was largely neglected for many decades
by historians, political scientists and lawyers. The dominant paradigm of
political sociology from Marx to Barrington Moore, for one, has stressed the
importance of internal social structure and culture in the shaping of politics
and the state, sidelining the calls of such eminent scholars as John Robert
Seeley, in the late nineteenth century, and Otto Hintze, in the 1960s, to
remedy the neglect of international factors in the explanation of domestic
political developments (Almond 1989, 239–41). Indeed, the intellectual
progeny of the same tradition continues to wield considerable influence (and
yield meaningful insights) by emphasizing the importance of inherited
cultural, ideological, socioeconomic, and institutional legacies to defining
post-transition outcomes of democracy, attitudes to liberal values, as well as
national and ethnic identities (Ekiert and Hanson 2003).
Several additional factors have conspired until fairly recently to suppress
both theoretical and empirical research into international influence on domes-
tic democratic development. When preoccupation with the international-
national linkages arose in the aftermath of the Second World War – notably in
the work of American diplomatic historians, political scientists and interna-
tional relations theorists such as Almond (1950), Dahl (1950) and Waltz
(1967) – the prism adopted first was a ‘bottom-up’ one, in which it was the
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impact of national factors on international politics that was the nexus of inquiry,
not the other way around (Haas 1964; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1976).
Normative judgments further stifled inquiry in this field. The dependency
movement of the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, while drawing attention to the
importance of external conditions on internal economic and political develop-
ments, perceived the influence of international factors to be wholly debilitating,
rather than enabling (Wallerstein 1979; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Developing
countries, so the Marxist inspired theory proclaimed, were condemned to wallow
in backwardness or suffer developmental retardation, by virtue of an interna-
tional class system dominated by western capitalist institutions. The narrative of
exploitation and damage infliction, on the part of the international system,
discouraged open-minded analysis of the possible role of external actors in
supporting or promoting democratic change in developing countries.
From the opposite side of the domestic/international divide, theories of 
international relations and international law have traditionally focused on
horizontal outcomes at the supranational level (notably interstate balance of
power, conflict, and cooperation), rather than the more vertical, “outside-in”
linkages between international agents and domestic factors (Pevehouse 2002,
516). Even more so than their international relations peers, international
lawyers have historically, and mostly remain, chiefly occupied with categoriz-
ing, analyzing and debating the rules of state responsibility, interstate rela-
tions and international organizations, largely shunning questions of domestic
regime characteristics and the potential influence of international rules on
national and sub-nation level systems (Fox and Roth 2000).
Although this lack of analytic attention has begun to be rectified, with
increasing intensity and sophistication in the last two decades, important
gaps in theoretical and empirical knowledge persist. Building on Charles
Tilly’s studies on the role of international competition in modern state forma-
tion (Tilly 1975), Peter Gourevitch’s insights on the circularity of
national–international interaction (Gourevitch 1978), as well as Robert
Putnam’s two-level international bargaining games (Putnam 1988), scholars
working from within different theoretical traditions (neoliberal internation-
alism, sociological and historical institutionalism, and social constructivism)
have, particularly since the end of the Cold War, contributed important
insights on the impact of international conditions, organizations and
networks, domestic security, economic, political, institutional, regulatory,
legal and normative behavior (Busch and Milner 1994; Checkel 2002, 2005;
Finnemore 1996; Goldstein 1998; Greif 2006; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990;
Kahler 1992; Keohane and Martin 1995; Pevehouse 2002; 2005; Pridham
1994; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001; Whitehead
1996a). One body of literature focused on democracy in particular has began
to theorize the mechanisms and pathways by which international factors may
facilitate democratization in transitional states, invoking notions such as
diffusion, contagion, gravity, demonstration effect, complex interdependence,
convergence, emulation, socialization, learning, conditionality and even zeitgeist
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(Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Grugel 1999; Huntington 1991; Kopstein and
Reilly 2000; Kubicek 2003; Linz and Stepan 1996; Pridham 1991; Simmons,
Dobbin and Garrett 2006). These notions are of variable analytic usefulness.
While Pevehouse’s work on the linkages between membership of international
organizations and transitions to democracy identifies important potential
causal mechanisms of International Organization influence on regime change
(Pevehouse 2002 and 2005), discussions of democratic diffusion (Gleditsch
and Ward 2006; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett
2006) fail to address causality or operationalize methods of external influence
on domestic change (Kubicek 2003, 4).
EU Cycles and Layers of International Democratic 
Anchoring (EUCLIDA)
This chapter outlines an analytical framework designed to approach these 
questions; a framework which is subsequently put to the test with reference
to each case study country, and which therefore provides the remainder of the
volume with a cohesive structure for comparative analysis. In approaching
this topic, we are consciously avoiding theory testing per se. Rather, since we
are seeking to conceptualize and explain phenomena involving complex link-
ages between power, interests, norms, human agency and legal-institutional
change, we engage in “analytical eclecticism” (Katzenstein and Okawara
2002), drawing selectively on the different theoretical traditions and insights
we view as necessary to advance clearer, finer-grained and more reliable
knowledge regarding the external–internal dynamic of democratization
processes and, more instrumentally, enabling environments for successful
DRoL developments in domestic systems. More precisely, the ‘analytical
ecleticism’ we engage is, first of all, problem-driven and aimed at finding a
framework to analyze in an empirically effective way several cases within a
similar system comparative design. Thus, the traditional agency dominant
literature on democratization (Morlino 1998; Whitehead 2001c) is comple-
mented by the rationalist approach and the constructivist one in the way
Fearon and Wendt (2005, 68) suggest: “the most fruitful framing of ‘ration-
alism v. constructivism’ is a pragmatic one, treating them as analytical lenses
for looking at social reality”, as do Checkel (2005, 801–26) as well as Risse
and Ropp (1999, 272–3) when adding strategic calculations or instrumental
reasoning to role playing or persuasion and to normative suasion or 
institutionalization and habitualization.
The overarching notion we propose as a means of conceptualizing external
influence on domestic DRoL change processes, and the interaction between
the two is democratic anchoring. At the highest level of analysis, anchoring
affirms an essentially dichotomous, two-level prism according to which in the
contemporary international system nation-state regimes are subject to variably
dense external (international, transnational and supranational) linkages, pres-
sures and stimuli influencing internal conditions of democracy, yet democracy
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and processes of democratization exist solely within national systems, so that
the proper level of analysis of democratization processes remains essentially
domestic and the correct nexus of inquiry ought therefore to focus on identifying
empirically discernable external–internal agency interaction.
Any analysis of international influence on domestic democratic change, in
other words, must begin with the recognition of an overarching, structural
constraint regarding the role of external factors. Since, by definition, democ-
ratization involves processes of change in the governing of a demos – a self-
defined community based on citizenship and distinguishing the ‘us’ from the
‘them’ – such processes always are, in a fundamental sense, an essentially
“domestic drama” (Whitehead 1986). Even in the most extreme cases of
external intervention therefore (such as long-term control by an occupying
power), democratization in any meaningful sense must entail the free exercise
of rights of citizenship in a sovereign entity, all of which depend on domes-
tic actors, institutions and procedures. As such, it is difficult to view interna-
tional factors as truly independent variables, since democratization processes
(unlike modernization, for instance) are ultimately always carried through
domestic actors, institutions and procedures. It is external–internal interac-
tions, rather than external factors per se, which are more accurately said to
shape domestic outcomes. The effects of international factors are, thus, only
apparent in changes occurring within national and sub-national systems
where the concept of a demos has any real meaning.
This does not mean that the notion of democratic anchoring falls into the
trap of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).
Although democratization processes are now unfolding within a radically
transformed international environment compared to two decades ago (thus
challenging our existing models), this does not mean, as Grugel (1999)
suggests, that it is no longer legitimate to maintain a basic analytical distinction
between domestic and external levels of analysis in democratization studies. 
A more accurate conception, we submit, is to embrace the nation/state/
society as the proper sociopolitical context of inquiry into democratization
processes – recognizing the inescapability of the primacy of the domestic in
democratization processes – and begin to address the various parts of the external-
influence-on-domestic-change puzzle in an integrated manner. This involves
three primary, interrelated components: firstly, identifying the different meth-
ods of possible external influence and different modes by which these interact
with domestic factors; secondly, conceptualizing the extent and nature – or
what we call ‘layers’ – of external impact, and; thirdly, tracing temporal and
spatial sequencing – or what we call ‘cycles’ – of such an impact.
Methods of influence, modes of interaction
We identify four main categories of methods of influence – control, conditionality,
socialization, and example – each involving different modes of interaction with
domestic systems and drawing on different theoretical traditions.1
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Democratic control
At the hardest edge of the spectrum of intervention tools available to the
most powerful western state actors (US), regional organizations (NATO, EU)
or global fora (UN), is the use of military force directly to overthrow an
authoritarian regime and attempt to install a viable democratic regime in its
place or, more commonly, attempt to build basic conditions of public security
and legality as part of a post-conflict state reconstruction effort.2
In instances where elected governments have been forcefully removed 
by military coup and have requested the intervention of external actors to
restore conditions of public order and democracy – as in Haiti (1994) and
Sierra Leone (1998) – virtually the entire international community has
accepted the use of coercive power as a legitimate means to reinstate the
ousted democratic regime (Stromseth Wippman and Brooks 2006). Where
military intervention took place without domestic invitation, the legality of
invasion pacts has been disputed, notably in cases of unilateral action (such as
the US invasion of Panama in 1989 and Iraq in 2003) or where no UN
Security Council authorization was obtained by external actors prior to the
initiation of military action (such as the above or NATO’s action against
Serbia in 1999).3
Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, the erosion of non-intervention
principles, coupled with a strengthening of human rights and humanitarian
intervention norms, have resulted in a proliferation of instances of “imposed
democratization” (see Whitehead 2004, 137). These have involved a range of
“neo-trusteeship” arrangements (Fearon and Laitin 2004), extending from
full military occupation led by a handful of states (Iraq) or a broader coalition
(Afghanistan), to variably robust UN peacekeeping and peace-building
missions (Liberia, East Timor) and long-term transitional administrations
(such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) – all with substantial post-conflict
state-building and rule-of-law promotion dimensions (Chesterman 2001;
2004b; Hysa 2004; Peceny 1999). Indeed, a focus on the establishment of
conditions of personal security and a popular perception that leaders respect
and are subject to the law, is increasingly identified as being perhaps the
single most important factor in determining the success or failure of 
democratic state building (Bratton and Chang 2006).
What unites the various forms of these interventions is a common method
of influence, namely control – or what Ikenberry and Kupchan have called
“internal reconstruction” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 58). Transformation
of domestic institutions and laws is achieved through direct intervention in
which the international/domestic membrane is pierced, often in the aftermath
of war. Though highly costly, often controversial, and of mixed success, taking
control of a country’s political institutions and processes, has historically 
been one method by which international actors can facilitate democratization,
or hamper it, as in the case of Soviet policy towards Central and Eastern
Europe during the Cold War. Owen (2002) lists no fewer than 198 cases
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(between 1555 and 2000) of forcible efforts by individual or groups of states
to create, preserve or alter the political institutions – including constitutions
and laws – within a third state, with post-World War II instances of such
imposition dominated by western great powers efforts to promote liberal
democracy. As a method of influence, control can be ‘heavy’ or ‘light’ – the
latter involving efforts to avoid local dependency through the early and/or
gradual transfer of control functions to indigenous authorities. It may extend
over the entire territory of a state, or be limited to seizure of strategic posts,
notably the capital city and the state’s borders. It may exist for a relatively
short period of time, as in the case of the Allied occupation of Japan and
Germany, or involve open-ended, long-term control by a succession of
controlling agents, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.4
Democratic conditionality
Short of deploying coercive intervention, powerful external actors manipulate
threats of punitive measures and promises of positive rewards to alter the
costs and benefits of domestic decision policy choices. Exogenously generated
sticks and carrots act either directly, by altering the instrumentalist calcula-
tions of governing elites, or indirectly, through the relative weakening of veto
players and the differentiated empowerment of domestic change agents
(Tsebelis 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a).
Methods of democratic conditionality fall into two broad categories: nega-
tive and positive. The first refers to non-military, coercive political, diplo-
matic and economic measures used to induce policy change in a targeted
country (Hart 2000; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1990; A. Smith 1995).
Although the efficacy and preferred design of sanctions are hotly debated,
serious violators of democratic principles are now far more likely to suffer
punitive measures than was the case even 20 years ago.5 Indeed, since the end
of the Cold War, it is difficult to find cases where political, diplomatic or
economic sanctions of some sort were not imposed in reaction to a breakdown
in democracy, as is evident from the imposition of sanctions on: Belarus (in
1997 and 2005), Cambodia (1997), Fiji (2000 and 2007), Guatemala (1993),
Haiti (1991 and 1994), Niger (1999), Pakistan (1999), Paraguay (1996),
Peru (1992), Thailand (2006), Venezuela (2002) and Zimbabwe (2002).
Worldwide, as Marinov (2004, 7) shows: “an illiberal state ran about 21%
risk of being subject to foreign pressure over its lack of political pluralism in
the year 2000. This compares to only about 3% in 1983”.6
Still more marked has been the increased deployment of positive condi-
tionality in the democracy promotion policies of leading western states and
the international organizations they dominate in the post-Cold War period
(Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Kelley 2004b; Woods 2005).7 Since the
collapse of Soviet communism in particular, western international actors have
generated a wide range of policy instruments to link progress in democrati-
zation to the receipt of various international entitlements. These have
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included making collective recognition of new states and governments
dependent on their adherence to democratic practices (Murphy 1999),
bundling the conferment of security, trade and aid benefits with acceptance
of democracy and human rights clauses in contractual agreements, and sanc-
tioning existing member states for conduct deviating from collective norms
(Halperin and Lomasney 1998; Horng 2003; Piccone 2004).
Moreover, democratic conditionality assumes two broad forms: the first,
and historically by far the more common of the two, has been ex ante condi-
tionality. Here benefits are provided prior to confirmation of compliance or
as a simple matter of reinforcement. Despite a recent, gradual shift away from
it, ex ante conditionality still characterizes the bulk of aid expenditure poli-
cies practiced by multilateral development banks and leading donor states
(Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor 2004; Svensson 2000). The democracy and
rule-of-law promotion policies of some regional organizations, such as the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and human
rights and democracy clauses inserted by the EU into its regular free trade
agreements with third countries, similarly follow the ex ante model (Horng
2003). Overall, studies in the last two decades have shown a meager, though
not entirely negligible, systematic relationship between this variety of posi-
tive conditionality and policy changes in targeted states. However, as Collier
argues, failures of conditionality may be at least partially attributable to
perverse incentives within and among donor institutions, resulting in donors
being insufficiently motivated to punish recipients of aid for non-compliance
(Collier 1997; Collier and Dollar 2004).
The second form of democratic conditionality involves “reinforcement by
reward”, in which material and symbolic goods are provided only ex post in
cases where the targeted government complies with the conditions, and the
benefit is withheld where it does not.8 Governments that fail to respond to
incentives to adopt and implement prescribed reforms are neither coerced nor
rewarded, but are left to bear the costs of exclusion (from aid allocation, favor-
able trade and investment conditions, security guarantees, membership in
organizations or other forms of linkages to benefit-granting international
regimes) until such a time as they, or a successive government, decide to
comply. Until recently, the number of international actors able and willing to
deploy this type of external pressure has been very small. In Europe, where
the practice of ex post conditionality has assumed the most advanced, institu-
tionalized forms, there have been glaring cases of “wasted leverage” (K. Smith
2001, 43). Most notably, the Council of Europe has largely opted to forego
stringent membership conditionality in favor of a policy emphasizing post-
accession socialization into western liberal practices. Its pre-accession proce-
dures, therefore, have been slack, a reality epitomized by the controversial
acceptance of Albania (1995), Russia and Croatia (1996), the southern
Caucasus countries (1999 to 2002) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (2003). Indeed,
even in Europe, as Schimmelfennig (2005, 832–3) argues: “reinforcement by
tangible punishments and rewards has been limited to the two organizations
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capable of providing material incentives and disincentives in the areas of
security and welfare: the EU and NATO.” Outside Europe, the World Bank’s
growing disappointment with the results of its traditional ex ante condition-
ality policies, has spurred it, over the last several years, to shift to a concept
of what it calls “selectivity” – where aid agreements are only concluded with
those states whose policy choices already demonstrate a prior commitment to
reform (World Bank 2001, 193–6). This shift does not reflect any truly new
insights into external influence methodology since “to an extent selectivity is
no more than ex-post conditionality.” (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor 2004,
220). In essence, the same logic underlies the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) initiative, launched by the Bush administration in March
2002. The MCC preconditions the receipt of aid by targeted governments on
a demonstrated “commitment to policies that promote political and
economic freedom, investments in education and health, control of corrup-
tion, and respect for civil liberties and the rule of law by performing well on
16 different policy indicators.”9
Unlike coercive interventions that rely on a method of control, the mech-
anisms of influence underlining punitive and positive external incentives
assume (a) that domestic actors retain a degree of autonomous choice and (b)
that those actors respond to a “logic of anticipated consequences and prior
preferences.” (March and Olsen 1998, 949). All strategies of conditionality,
in other words, follow an actor-based, rational bargaining logic of influence,
emphasizing a utilitarian calculation where domestic decision constituencies
are affected by the costs and benefits of compliance. In this latter sense,
conditionality is linked to example since domestic costs will be higher where
there is a weaker cultural match between the externally driven rule and
domestic norms. The potency of conditionality varies and can be shaped
along several axes, including: the relative bargaining power of the actors
(including the availability of realistic alternatives for the targeted state); size
and speed of rewards; the credibility of conditionality; the size and distribu-
tion of domestic costs of compliance; and the determinacy of conditions
applied.10 Determinacy (or specificity) also plays an important role in shap-
ing the effectiveness of conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005a). Determinacy refers to (a) the clarity and (b) the formality of the rule
– what some have called the “density of norms” (Jacoby and Cernoch 2002,
320). The more specific and formal the rule, the higher its determinacy value.
High determinacy serves an informational role, acting as a road map for the
targeted government, and at the same time enhances the credibility of the
conditionality, as it narrows the scope for interpretation and therefore manip-
ulation of the rule and aids monitoring of compliance. Moreover, condition-
ality allows other methods of influence, such as the exercise of normative
pressure and persuasion, to be pressed by the promoter with greater confi-
dence, since these rhetorical actions are then made in the shadow of material
incentives for compliance (Kelley 2004a). Conditionality can influence the
target government either directly, through bargaining, or indirectly through
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the differential empowerment of domestic actors. In the latter sense, 
conditionality changes the domestic power dynamics in favor of domestic
actors with incentives to adopt EU rules and norms, and strengthening their
position in relation to opponents in government and society.
Democratic socialization
If incentive-based instruments rely on the superior leverage external actors
can wield, what may be termed “international democratic socialization”
represents a distinct method of external influence which aims to facilitate
internalization of democratic norms, policies and institutions through the
establishment and intensification of linkages between liberal international
fora and state actors in transitional countries (Checkel 2001; 2005; Johnston
2001; Kelley 2004a; Levitsky and Way 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005a;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a).
International democratic socialization – defined as a process of inducting 
individuals and states into the democratic norms and rules of a given regional,
international or transnational community – involves variably intrusive link-
ages, with the socialization potential and practices of different international
actors ranging on a continuum of intensity. As Levitsky and Way assert, at the
highest level of abstraction there exist at least five dimensions of such linkages:
(1) economic ties, which include trade, credit, investment and assistance; (2)
geopolitical ties, which include membership in, or other forms of association
with, regional or global governance institutions and alliances; (3) social link-
age, including migration, diaspora communities, technical and professional
epistemic communities and elite education; (4) communication linkage,
including cross-border telecommunications and media; and (5) transnational
civil society ties, including involvement with international NGOs, multilateral
corporations, social entrepreneurship organizations, party foundations, bar
associations, and churches (Levitsky and Way 2005).
Focusing on a narrower, though still vast category of international factors,
Slaughter (2004) has flagged the importance of “government networks” (infor-
mation networks, enforcement networks and harmonization networks, operat-
ing across regulatory, legislative and judicial functions of governance) to
western efforts to transform bad governments, or partially replace them in
failed, weak or transitional states. Horizontal regulatory networks of national
officials interacting in their respective issue areas range from anti-money laun-
dering and anti-corruption regulation, to law enforcement, and human rights
protection. Information networks involve judges, legislators, regulators and
enforcement agents coming together in a myriad of fora, such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
Commonwealth, to discuss, collect and distill professional best practices; while
horizontal enforcement networks (such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL, at the
global and regional levels) are increasingly compelled to interact due to the
growing activity in transnational illegal activities (Slaughter 2004, 135–44).
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Many of the horizontal networks, as well as some of the modes of linkage
identified above (social, educational, technological, and cultural), represent
diffuse, non-institutionalized mechanisms of potential influence. These may
be understood as situated closer to the soft end of the intervention spectrum,
adjacent to the dispersed modern world society scripts identified by Meyer
and others as having been influential in the spread of a host of “administra-
tive rationality” features in transitional countries.11
International actors also deploy a range of tools intended to ‘name and
shame’ states into compliance with democratic practices, with little or no
institutionalized engagement and attempts at deliberative induction into
community practices and norms. Normative pressure can take the form of
informal verbal pressure where a prominent leader of a democratic country,
international institution or NGO makes use of the bully pulpit to laud
certain practices, berate others, or place a targeted phone call to a foreign
leader at decision-making junctures, with specific demands.12 Normative
pressure can, and increasingly does, assume more formal, structured shape.
Observation of national elections, plebiscites and referenda to monitor proce-
dural fairness, violations of basic political and human rights tied to electoral
contestation, and even campaign financing in countries claiming to be demo-
cratic, has become the international norm, and has reached a high degree of
institutionalization (Carothers 1997; Santa Cruz 2005). Governments, inter-
national organizations and leading NGOs – such as Amnesty International,
Transparency International and Human Rights Watch – issue regular decla-
rations, reports and demarches, openly criticizing countries on a host of rule-
of-law issues, from corruption, to abuse of rights, to detention and prison
conditions. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US
Department of State, for example, is mandated under the Foreign Assistance
Act (FAA) to submit to Congress annual country reports on human rights
practices and democratic government. The first reports, compiled in 1977,
covered 82 countries sreceiving US aid, whereas in 2006, 196 reports were
presented to Congress. Among the 46 members of the Council of Europe,
similarly, a number of intergovernmental committees monitor and report on
the state of compliance with Council of Europe conventions and non-binding
guidelines on a broad range of rule-of-law issues.13
The post-Cold War explosion of interest in the quality of domestic governance
has, in the last decade, generated an unprecedented proliferation in the compi-
lation and dissemination of democracy and governance indicators.14 Based on the
maxim that you can only monitor what you measure, a plethora of international
actors – from private investors and corporate risk analysts, to multilateral devel-
opment agencies and academics – now generate dozens of governance indicators
and databases, that provide ready, quantitative canon fodder for business, policy
and academic audiences to critique practically every country in the world on a
broad range of democracy, human rights and rule-of-law issues.15
At the harder, more heavily institutionalized edge of the linkage category,
furthermore, we locate what Slaughter calls “vertical networks” – global or,
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more commonly, regional organizations and their deliberative processes,
which perform two related functions of international socialization. First,
international institutions, such as the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the World Bank, International Labour Organization (ILO) and
OECD, function as norm entrepreneurs and teachers of norms – generating
and disseminating information about appropriate templates of policy, insti-
tutional design and administrative conduct (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1999). Second, international organizations
and the processes they foster act as social environments that shape domestic
policy choices, behavior and possibly even the identity of governmental,
bureaucratic and broader societal actors who interact with them (Grigorescu
(2003); Johnston 2001; Simmons, Dobbins and Garrett 2006).
Liberal international actors can, and do, shape the fora they control in an
effort to reconfigure the preferences and identities of targeted states. Since the
end of the Cold War, regional organizations in particular have defined the
international democratic socialization of transitional states as a new core task
for themselves (first, in post-Communist countries and Latin America,
extending gradually into Africa), and devised an increasingly institutional-
ized set of instruments to support and promote, inter alia, rule-of-law reforms
by fully or partially anchoring targeted countries in pre-existing international
liberal communities.16 Beyond Europe, international democratic socialization
mechanisms have so far been less robust, but present nonetheless. In 1990,
for example, the Organization of American States (OAS) – in which all 
35 independent states of the Americas are members – established a Unit for
the Promotion of Democracy, to encourage members “to renew, preserve and
strengthen democratic institutions.”17 The Inter-American Juridical
Committee of the OAS, similarly, polices the implementation of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter (adopted on 11 September, 2001), and
provides an institutionalized platform for regular deliberation and the
promotion of legal integration in a range of rule-of-law topics, such as admin-
istration of justice, measures to combat crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and
corruption, police standards, judicial cooperation, access to justice, and
protection of fundamental rights.18
There is some evidence, too, that the use of international socialization mech-
anisms is proliferating geographically and thematically. It remains to be seen,
for instance, whether the African Peer Review Mechanism – established under
the auspices of the African Union (AU) in 2002 as part of growing interna-
tional donor pressure for better governance – would or would not evolve into
a useful collective peer pressure mechanism capable of inducting states into
the AU’s formal commitment to “promote and protect human and people’s
rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and ... ensure good
governance and the rule of law.”19 In an attempt to ensure that emerging
powers buy into the core tenets of the US-led international order, moreover,
Washington has been in the last several years striving to include countries like
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China, India and Brazil in a diverse set of regional and global fora ranging
from G-7 meetings and the Inter-American Development Bank, to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the World Trade Organization WTO (Drezner 2007).
Whereas external incentives modes of influence follow rational choice
expectations of state behavior, theoretically mechanisms of state/agent social-
ization sit more comfortably with norm-based, social constructivist and social
psychology explanations for individual and collective action. The notion of
international democratic socialization, in other words, assumes that domestic
decision-makers are themselves cognitive-social actors that respond, at least
in part, to a “logic of appropriateness”, where ideas, norms and identity shape
compliance with and internalization of rules and institutions (March and
Olsen 1998, 951). According to this method of influence, external impact on
domestic democratic development is not reducible to materialist, cost-bene-
fit balancing of predetermined interests. Rather, those interests themselves
are best understood as the product of social structures and interactions. Since
“actors who enter into a social interaction rarely emerge the same” (Johnston
2001, 488), processes of rule-of-law change occur through deliberative,
communicative processes of habituation, argumentation and persuasion
(Checkel 2005; Risse 1999).
Socialization may take more than one form. Agents may change their
domestic institutions and policies by virtue of having their choice of modes
of behavior bounded by external organizations, networks and rules (Jacoby
2004; Jones 1999) – complying with rules and norms expected of them by
virtue of their belonging to a certain community, irrespective of whether they
internalize these rules and accept them as their own. Alternatively, following
a logic of appropriateness may extend beyond ordering from a circumscribed
menu of socially acceptable policy choices, and involve agents internalizing
community or organizational norms as appropriate, legitimate and correct in
their own right.20
Moreover, the ‘influence density’ of different international socialization
mechanisms (whether horizontal or vertical) would differ depending on a vari-
ety of factors, including the duration and intensity of interaction, the perceived
legitimacy of the socializing actor, the determinacy of the rules it seeks to have
internalized, and the financial and technical resources it can muster to encour-
age socialization. Thus, unlike the more passive democratic example method of
influence, democratic socialization involves an active, deliberative aspect where
impact on domestic systems is assumed to be enhanced by the intensification
of opportunities for complex learning, deliberation and shifts in identity. 
In institutional terms this can happen through the development of political
dialogue, bureaucratic and professional collaboration and academic networks, as
well as mass exchanges through popular media, movement of persons, youth,
education and cultural exchanges. Socialization will be eased where externally
driven reforms are seen as legitimate and the demand for compliance deemed
by domestic constituencies to be substantively and procedurally fair.
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Democratic example
Finally, the fourth method of external influence on domestic rule-of-law devel-
opment is captured in the notion of democratic example, or demonstration.
According to this model, state and societal actors in transitional states accept
new rules, institutions and policy choices not as a result of external incentives
or socialization, but through sheer emulation of a successful external model.
The prosperity, security, freedom and eunomia of leading democratic states
serve as exemplars, a “city upon the hill” which others are inspired by and seek
to mimic (Haveman 1993).
A number of causal processes have been suggested for emulation of a
successful democratic example. Voluntary lesson drawing (Dolowitz and
Marsh 2000; Rose 1991; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) – which can
assume straightforward copying or loose imitation – can take place as the
result of internal dissatisfaction with the policy status quo, coupled with the
transferability of external norms, policies and institutions. This assumes
certain capacities and a sequence of policy decisions: domestic policy-makers
are dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs; they define the problem and
mark it as potentially solvable, or at least improvable, through the adoption of
new rules, institutions or policies; they look outside their domestic system to
an external source identified as a potential model for emulation; form the
perception that the external practices, rules or institutions are successful in
solving difficulties identical, or at least comparable to those at home; deter-
mine that the external rules are not only technically transferable, but politi-
cally acceptable (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a, 22–4). A second
main approach to emulation relies on insights from group theory in social
psychology. Free of control, conditionality or active induction, some scholars
suggest that geographic (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Whitehead 2001c) and
psychological proximity (Rose 1993) facilitates emulation, a phenomenon
which helps explain the temporal and regional sequencing of democratization
processes (Lankina and Getachew 2006). From this perspective, actors emulate
the conduct of their self-identified peer group, with which they identify and
strive to be associated. World society scholarship and literatures on epistemic
communities offer additional strands on the causal processes of emulation.
Meyer and others suggest that countries establish institutions and sign up to
various international obligations for diffuse, “world social” reasons, acquiring
a sense of belonging and identification with modernity by rhetorically and
legally embracing human rights, labour, environmental and public health
standards, even where they lack both the capacity and intention to put them
into effect (Meyer et al. 1997a; Hathaway 2002). These processes of emulation
may be catalyzed by the presence of epistemic communities, where profes-
sional, technocratic and academic groups influence governments to adopt new
rules and policies by setting agendas, defining problems and formulating
policy solution options in a manner that makes them accessible to domestic
decision-makers (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, 800).
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Democratic anchoring, in sum, may involve four main methods of influ-
ence, ranging on a spectrum of measures, from deliberate, highly institution-
alized, intrusive (occasionally coercive) mechanisms, to the type of diffuse
scripts identified by world society scholars. In practical, policy-oriented
terms, the most promising and potentially malleable methods of anchoring
are represented by the two mid-range methods of influence: conditionality21
and socialization, since anchoring through control usually involves highly
costly (sometimes in blood as well as money) instruments of engagement that
western actors are generally reluctant to expend, whereas democratic exam-
ples entail culture, ideas and norms the construction and controlled use of
which policy actors are generally ill prepared for. Moreover, in a strictly
empirical perspective, while control is very easy to be proved because its same
characteristics, emulation is very elusive and in the best case can be indirectly
suggested. At the end, however, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, it is largely
through the gradual development and deployment of the conditionality and
socialization type methods of democratic anchoring that the EU has sought
to transform neighboring countries. All in all, these are the reasons why we
decided to focus on those two mechanisms and leave out control and demo-
cratic example or emulation.
Layers of impact, cycles of change
If we now have a clearer understanding of the types of external methods of
influence that exist and their different logics of persuasion, the next step is to
develop an integrated framework for an empirical analysis of external actor
impact on domestic change processes, which involves asking what that
impact actually consists of, how it occurs, and in what sequences.
Academic engagement with these questions, where it exists at all, has
tended to remain rather evasive. Lawyers approaching the topic of external
influence on domestic legal reforms have sought to avoid the methodological
challenges of looking beyond formal compliance with international rules, into
genuine implementation of commitments (Hathaway 2002). The problem of
implementation and internalization is also central in the ‘spiral model’,
proposed by Risse and Sikkink (1999, esp. 17–35) and in the ‘membership
conditionality’ model developed by Schimmelfennig (2005a), who set as their
dependent variable formal and informal “rule adoption” involving the trans-
position of EU law into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic institu-
tions according to EU standards, and the change of domestic political practices
according to EU practices (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a, 7).
Here we propose that democratic anchoring involving external actor 
efforts to promote legal, institutional and behavioral change should be
conceptualized as potentially involving three related, but analytically distinct
“layers” of impact, namely, rule adoption, rule implementation, and rule
internalization.
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Rule adoption (RA)
Following Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s formulation (2005a), RA
involves the transposition of EU mandated rules and standards into domestic
laws, the restructuring of domestic institutions according to EU rules and the
changing of domestic political practices in line with EU standards. With
regard to the DRoL, rule adoption concerns five main substantive domains.
The first two, that is, (1) protection of civil freedoms and political rights and
(2) institutional and administrative capacity to formulate, implement and
enforce, refer to the moment when the decision to have a democracy is made
and implemented. In fact, they substantiate that decision. The other three
domains to include in the analysis are: (3) the independence of the judiciary
and a modern justice system; (4) the fight against corruption, illegality and
abuse of power by state agencies; and (5) effective “civilian control of the
police and other security forces.
Within those domains RA means the formal passage of domestic legisla-
tion, the establishment of domestic institutions, as promoted by the relevant
external actors. The scope and intensity of RA may vary extensively.
Adoption may be limited to harmonization of legislation in specific, func-
tional, ‘low-politics’ areas. At the other end of the spectrum, insertion can
involve fundamental constitutional provisions that go to the heart of
national sovereignty, and may involve massive en bloc acceptance of external
laws. RA may also entail a commitment to ongoing, even future, adjustment
of domestic rules – as is the case in the European Economic Area (EEA)
countries with regard to Single Market rules.
Rule implementation (RIm)
Here, we are considering preliminarily the development or improvement of
the rules, governing institutions, administrative structures that are necessary
to implement the required and possibly adopted changes. That is, to have any
implementation process there has to be prior development of institutional
and administrative capacity (IAC). In our view this is one of the key factors
explaining the institutional “decoupling” (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, Ramirez,
1997a, esp. 154–6) or “institutional hypocrisy” (Katzenstein and Iankova,
2003) those and other authors suggested. That is, the gap between formal
rule adoption and implementation. Our hypothesis here is that if we have
poorly developed institutions and bureaucracy that decoupling becomes very
obvious. Furthermore, we should be ready to observe deliberate emptying of
reform content by governmental actors who feel compelled (by domestic or
external pressures) to assume formal legal or institutional commitments, but
who then act to minimize, retard or completely block the intended effects of
those commitments.
The difference, here suggested, between institutions and administration is a
classical one where the key institutions, such as cabinet, parliament and
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magistracy are differentiated from bureaucracies, local and central. The neces-
sity of such a development has already been a crucial point of debate in west-
ern European countries when a reformist government comes to office and tries
to implement the changes that made possible its victory in political elections.
Likewise, there can be the strongest elite commitment to rule adoption and
rules can be approved, but if there is little or no IAC, then any decision is
bound to remain just on paper.
RIm goes in the same five directions as RA: (1) protection of civil freedoms
and political rights; (2) additional institutional and administrative structures to
formulate, implement and enforce the law; (3) judicial independence and a
modern justice system; (4) fight against corruption, illegality and abuse of power
by state agencies; (5) police reform and civilian control of the security forces.
Rule internalization (RI)
RI means the acceptance of transferred rules, beyond formal adoption among
state bureaucracy, political elites, relevant groups and the wider public, that
is, a slower and gradual sub-process of legitimation of both the adopted rules
and the institutions that were set in motion, making the RA and the devel-
opment of IAC more than a superficial result without actual meaning. We
can assume that only when RI gradually takes place does the implementation,
which is relevant for the growth of DRoL, actually take place as well.
The entire framework with its three layers may be better presented by
answering three related questions: how rule adoption is achieved; how the
implementation is carried out; and how some degree of rule internalization is
achieved. The reply to these questions also allows us to present our main
hypotheses, but before moving on in this direction the basic lines of our
reasoning can be clarified by making explicit the underlying matrix (see
Table 2.1). The matrix also helps to stress and clarify an important theoreti-
cal feature. The dimension we call ‘institutional, administrative structures’
refers to the development of institutional and bureaucratic capacity and
entails the three processes of RA, RIm and RI. But here, actually, two differ-
ent moments in time are conflated for analytical reasons, although the time
difference has to be maintained for a correct reading of the process. In fact,
only when that capacity begins developing in at least the first and second
processes (RA and RIm) (see the third column in Table 2.1, i.e. the vertical
direction of the matrix), can the real process of RI actually begin; this 
is relevant for the development of that entire process (see the third row in
Table 2.1, i.e. the horizontal direction of the matrix).
Before going on to propose conditions and pathways under which the three
layers of change occur, it may be useful to add the dimension of temporality and
sequencing to the equation. It is proposed that democratic anchoring involves
‘cycles’, as well as layers of change. Indeed, as also proposed in the “spiral
model” by Risse and Sikkink with the “boomerang throws” (1999a, 18),
anchoring is a long iterated process, where the different events and moments,
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occasionally close in time, in one sector follow the same direction. Prolonged
stops, delayed effects and reverse of direction may be anticipated before the
DRoL becomes genuinely internalized and entrenched. Thus, within those
cycles there is a different pace of possible changes in the various aspects
involved in the development of rule-of-law conditions. The three main layers
of change, which may well develop at different – even extremely different –
paces, are rule adoption, rule implementation and rule internalization. The
connections between the first two components of the process (RA and RIm)
lie in the fact that RA is a condition for RIm and in this way to the develop-
ment of DRoL when RI is added and considered (see Figure 2.1).
When does rule adoption take place? To disentangle the sub-process that
brings about RA we begin with the actions of international actors (IAs),
which is part of the anchoring mechanism, to meet the actions of domestic
actors, some of whom are change agents. Action of IAs, be they EU officials
or representatives, IMF officials, western government representatives, or
others, has to be credible. That is, there have to be the commitments and the
resources for those actions by the involved actors, otherwise the entire process
is bound to fail. A key point in this is what goals are set out by the IAs. If
the EU is the actor, then may membership or virtual membership, that is, the
involvement in different policies with similar integrative effect, have a simi-
lar impact? This is a more specific, but very important question that our
research addresses and answers.
Change agents (ChAs)
Here we borrow this notion from social-constructivist theory, which points to
such an additional domestic variable which should be accounted for when
seeking to explain rule adoption in the subject states – namely the degree to
which change agents are present in the domestic system. According to this
notion, change agents or “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998) not only mobilize to pressurize decision-makers to adopt democratic
rules by increasing the costs for reform-recalcitrant elites, but they also
engage domestic decision-makers in processes of persuasion and social 
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Figure 2.1 The outcomes of EUCLIDA
Rule Adoption (RA)
Institutional and
Administrative Capacity (IAC)
Rule Internalization (RI)
Rule
Implementa-
tion
(RIm)
Democratic
Rule of Law
Outcomes
(DRoLO)
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learning to redefine their interests and identities. We can distinguish
between two main mechanisms by which this process occurs – a structural
mechanism and a more agency-centred mechanism.
The first account focuses on institutional isomorphism. Domestic institu-
tions that frequently interact with other institutions (both domestic and
external) and private actors (such as private NGOs) are more open to being
influenced by change agents and over time converge with the influencing
agents in their formal organizational structures, practices, meaning structures
and reform patterns (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott and Meyer 1994).
The degree of exposure and openness will therefore determine the propensity
for social learning and rule adoption. The second, agency-centered mecha-
nism focuses on socialization processes, whereby domestic actors (either
governmental or informal) internalize norms and practices in order to become
members of international society “in good standing” (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998). They are socialized into appropriateness through processes of persua-
sion and social learning which redefine their interests, creating momentum
for change (Checkel 1999).
In this context, we would take into account the proposition that these
processes are facilitated by dense interaction between domestic and external
“epistemic communities” – actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge
and a normative agenda (Haas 1992) – such as elite decision-makers, bureau-
cracies, professional associations, NGOs, think-tanks and academics. In prac-
tical terms, therefore, the presence or absence of such epistemic communities
and the density of their interaction with the external promoter should influ-
ence rule adoption and, later on, internalization as well.
Shift in costs and benefits balance (CBB)
This key notion of costs and benefits of adjustments draws upon a neo-insti-
tutional approach that assumes a “logic of consequences” (March and Olsen
1989; 1988), whereby domestic leaders respond to external democracy promo-
tion according to their calculations of the benefits and costs of compliance. 
A target state will adopt the rules advanced by an external promoter if and
where the benefits of reward exceed the domestic costs of adoption or, if at
some point there is an actual shift in the balance between costs and benefits.
This general proposition contains several features that need to be unpacked.
First, we need to take account of the degree of ‘misfit’ or basic differences
between the domestic norms, rules and policy willingness, on the one hand,
and the norms and rules promoted by the EU, on the other hand. These
differences represent “adaptation pressure” (Borzel and Risse 2000). Clearly,
some adaptation pressure must exist for change to occur – a perfect fit
between the domestic and external rule obviates the need for rule transfer.
The greater the misfit, the greater the adaptation pressure will be. Second,
according to this notion the size of domestic compliance costs and their
distribution among domestic actors will greatly influence the decision
44 Leonardo Morlino and Amichai Magen
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whether to accept or reject the rule promoted. Thus, the costs will be higher
and not acceptable, or lower and acceptable, depending on: (1) the differences
between the domestic and external rule; (2) whether the rule advanced by the
external promoter relates to a matter of ‘low politics’ or a matter of ‘high poli-
tics’, that is, at the core of national power arrangements; and (3) the strength
of the domestic opposition to its adoption. Adoption costs can have different
sources: (1) they may take the form of opportunity costs of foregoing alterna-
tive rewards offered by adopting rules other than those promoted by the
external actor; (2) they may entail the constraining of autonomous behavior
by the target state; (3) they may produce welfare or power costs for public or
private actors in the domestic system.
The preferences of the government and other “veto players” – i.e. actors
whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo – are a critical
component here (Tsebelis 2002). We will therefore need to account for the veto
players with significant net costs of rule adoption, as well as the relative
strength of veto players in different policy contexts. On the basis of the litera-
ture related to Europeanization and the central and eastern European countries
(Borzel and Risse 2000; Dimitrova 2002; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel
2003), we can hypothesize that rule adoption will be easier and more effective
in countries and policy areas where the veto players incurring costs are weaker
and can be overcome.
A key aspect is the shift in the CBB in the perception of decision-makers
as a result of the interaction between international actors (IAs) and change
agents (ChAs). In fact, because of this interaction there may be changes in
opportunity structures, empowerment of ChAs or other governmental elite,
or civil society groups, and relative weakening of veto players. If some of
these partially or largely take place, then there is a shift in the CBB. This shift
may bring about a policy reassessment and the actual subsequent rule adop-
tion when there is domestic fluidity, or the opposite situation, that is, domes-
tic stability, but with a diffuse perception of legitimacy of the RA. Moreover,
no real alternative is present.
Domestic fluidity posits that external democracy promotion is more likely
to be effective in uncertain (or ‘fluid’) political environments, when state
actors will be more open to new solutions and the possibility of substantial
domestic change. According to this hypothesis, in situations of political
fluidity – such as following the collapse of an ideological regime or in the
aftermath of deep internal crisis or conflict – where there are elite and 
popular pressures for a re-orientation of state direction and state leaders 
may themselves be new and lack entrenched directions, the domestic system
will be more open to international influence.
The presence of alternatives
If regimes have (or, more accurately, perceive themselves to have) economic
and political alternatives, they will be less likely to be influenced by pressures
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from a given international actor. Put differently, we need to ask what is the
subject country’s “best alternative to inclusion” within the promoting inter-
national actor’s economic/political system. EU conditionality of any kind, in
particular, would not be effective if the target government had other sources
offering comparable benefits (Killick 1996, 221–4). Hence, a hypothesis to
be tested is that EU influence will be weakened where a neighboring state
finds affiliation and support from other powerful international actors –
Turkey (US), Ukraine (Russia), Morocco (the Arab world), for example. If, on
the other hand, the persuader is seen as authoritative – i.e. the EU is viewed
as vital to the state’s economic and political wellbeing – whereas the influ-
ence of other actors is limited, then EU promotion efforts are likely to be
more effective.
On the whole, the sub-process of rule adoption is as follows: when credible
actions of IAs are complemented by actions of committed change actors, 
then there are changes in opportunity structures, empowerment of change
agents or of governmental elite or of civil society groups and relative 
weakening of veto players; if so, there is the possibility of a shift in CBB for
decision-makers; if there is domestic fluidity and no presence of domestic or
international-related alternatives, then the shifts bring a policy reassessment;
if there is a policy reassessment, then there can be rule adoption. But there is
also the opposite possibility at every step, of course, especially if no policy
reassessment occurs. Figure 2.2 summarizes our hypotheses.
When does rule implementation take place? The presence of effective
formal institutions provides actors with material, human and ideational
resources to undertake rule adoption. We must account, therefore, for situa-
tions where domestic actors are willing to adopt and internalize rules
promoted by external actors, but where they are unable to undertake the whole
or parts of this process by virtue of lacking the necessary action capacity. 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
IAs’ action in
substantive
domain 
ChAs’ action
Shift in CBB
for decision-
makers
Presence of alternatives
No
result
Rule
Adoption
Figure 2.2 The path to rule adoption
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All other factors being equal, the presence of formal facilitating institutions
determines whether reform-oriented actors are able to achieve domestic
processes of rule implementation.
Again with this second sub-process there is a point of departure when the 
credible actions of international actors are complemented by the commit-
ment of change agents with regard to: the setting up of an institutional and
administrative capacity to formulate, implement and enforce the law; the
development of an independent judiciary and a modern justice system; a
police reform and civilian control of the security forces. If this happens, then
there is a growth in knowledge resources, material resources and learning
opportunities inside the country. Such a growth is filtered and occasionally
stopped and distorted by bureaucratic inertia and the non-commitment of
decision-makers. If this happens to a high degree, then there is no improve-
ment in IAC and even the rule adoption is seriously undermined. If bureau-
cratic inertia and non-commitment are successfully overcome by the
complementary commitments mentioned earlier of international and domes-
tic actors, then an improvement in IAC is achieved and rule implementation
is possible. Figure 2.3 summarizes the path of a part of this second 
sub-process, where special attention should be devoted to step 2.
When does rule internalization take place? The fabric of each of our subject
countries is, to a considerable degree, unique. Differences in legacy, socioeco-
nomic conditions and national culture can be neither ignored nor controlled
for with any scientific rigor – but they can, indeed must, be recognized and
accounted for as fully as possible. Achieving a deep contextual understanding
of domestic conditions is very important.22 However, the third sub-process of
RI has its own path, which can be applied to each of the case study countries
under scrutiny.
The starting point is similar to the previous one, but on the whole the sub-
process of RI is actually a distinct one, since it concerns essentially cognitive
processes at both elite and mass levels. To be effective, this layer of change
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Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
IAs’ Action in
Institutional
and
Administrative
Capacity (IAC) 
ChAs’ action
Growth in
knowledge
resources,
filtering
through
bureaucratic
inertia 
No
result
Rule
implementation
Figure 2.3 The path to rule implementation
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requires some a priori value commitment of change agents to democracy, better
if complemented by the presence of similar values in civil society. This means a
commitment to pluralistic liberal values, notably the rule of law, tolerance of
opposition, respect for different opinions, civil and political freedoms. If this
happens there is the possibility of a diffusion of those values as an effect of rule
adoption. Ironically, perhaps, formal rule adoption will take place first, with
normative commitment to it coming only later. This is where we can see at work
the core of a socialization process that, as happens in other domains when social-
ization is involved, results in a sort of chain where we find previous existence of
rules, protracted implementation of them, absorption and education. If there is
no presence of domestic alternatives, then such diffusion is more likely to take
place. If there is democratic value diffusion, then the democratic constituency
becomes larger and larger, and to different extent rule internalization is a conse-
quent result. If there is an absence, or scant diffusion of democratic values, no
diffusion occurs and no enlargement of the democratic constituency, with a
consequent lack of rule internalization. The key element, however, is the elaps-
ing of time that brings about that ‘habituation phase’ Rustow (1970) was recall-
ing or that ‘habitualization’ process Risse and Sikkink (1999a, 33) developed in
the final phase of their spiral model: “whereby international human rights norms
are fully institutionalized domestically and norm compliance becomes a habit-
ual practice of actors”. In an empirical perspective this usually implies an analy-
sis in the middle run and situations of stronger or weaker socialization. All this
will be seen in the empirical chapters and reconsidered in the conclusions. Here,
figure 2.4 displays this sub-process and its related hypotheses, and Figure 2.5 the
entire model with its different hypothesized connections. The whole model pres-
ents an already complex set of connections, steps, dimensions and variable
involved. From a strictly theoretical point of view it could have been even more
complex, but the purpose was to sketch an empirical model that could be useful
in setting the guidelines for sound empirical analysis. This is the challenge we
confront in the empirical chapters and in the conclusions.
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No
result
Rule
Internalization
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Presence of
alternatives
ChAs’ value
commitment
Diffusion of
values 
Rule Adoption
Figure 2.4 The path to rule internalization
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EUCLIDA does not come out of the blue, but in part develops and inte-
grates components of earlier insights drawn from both interest-based and
norm-based theories of compliance. Thus, likewise the ‘spiral model’ (Risse
and Sikkink 1999a) and the conditionality model (Schimmelfennig 2005a),
first, the attention is not only on rule adoption, but also rule implementation
and internalization, the three layers mentioned above; second, as the other
two, it aims to be a dynamics model where different cycles are singled out.
But differently from the ‘spiral model’, EUCLIDA focused on rule of law in
its five dimensions and not on human rights alone; had analytic purposes
rather than causal ones, that is, it was aimed at developing an integrated
analytical framework in the effort of capturing better the reality of different
cases; rather than to the impact of principles and ideas on domestic political
change, it pays specific attention to the interactions of institutions and people
and the shifting of balance that made domestic actors push in the direction
of rule of law; consequently, the main focus is on inside-out rather than on
outside-in. Differently from other models, such that on conditionality (see
above), here another basic mechanism will also be considered, that of social-
ization, as both conditionality and socialization are indeed the most recurrent
ones when the European Union as actor is involved. Finally, differently from
any other previous model, EUCLIDA is not a model for every empirical case,
but for the cases of hybrid regimes where democratic or quasi-democratic
domestic élites are present (see chapter 1). The main consequent asset of this
choice should be the possibility of a more precise, in depth analysis as it can
be done at a lower level of abstraction when also some of the main notions of
the literature of democratization is applied.
Notes
1 Several earlier studies offer their own typologies as to how international factors may shape
processes of democratization. Kubicek (2003, 4–7) offers four categories which partly overlap
with our own – (1) Control; (2) Contagion; (3) Convergence; and (4) Conditionality. In a typol-
ogy that similarly tries to conceptualize external influence on domestic change,
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a, 10–25) outline three competing explanatory models:
(1) the “external incentives model”; (2) the “social learning model”; and (3) the “lesson-drawing
model”. An earlier, influential conception is Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990) hegemonic power
and socialization thesis. These typologies do not, however, make the distinction between 
methods of influence and modes interaction, or address the latter in any systematic manner. 
2 Military intervention itself ranges from full military occupation to more limited paramilitary
intervention, support for one side in an internal conflict, or various types of covert involve-
ment. See Chesterman (2001); Forsythe (1992); Hendrickson (1994); Peceny (1999);
Schraeder (1992). 
3 See Reisman (1995), supporting military intervention in certain circumstances, versus Roth
(2000), arguing against the legality of such interventions. 
4 As part of international efforts towards successful implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace
Agreement, an international High Representative has effectively ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina
since 1997, with NATO, EU, OSCE and UN involvement. The High Representative’s
mandate was significantly strengthened at the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) meeting
in Bonn in late 1997. Since 2002 the High Representative has “double-hatted” as the EU’s
Special Representative (EUSR), reflecting a shift in strategy in which the EU has assumed
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greater responsibility to managing the trusteeship and intending to steer Bosnia-Herzegovina
into eventual EU membership. See Recchia (2007). 
5 The general thrust of the literature is that sanctions are rarely effective in promoting domes-
tic reforms. See: von Hippel (2000); A. Smith (1995); Hufbauer et al. (1990). In contrast,
several recent studies assert that the effectiveness of sanctions has been underestimated,
partly because of a problem of selection bias, since the bulk of successful coercion episodes
end with sanctions threatened but not actually imposed. See, in particular, Drezner (2003);
Blake and Klemm (2006). On choices in the design of sanctions regimes, particularly the use
of “smart sanctions” see Shagabutdinova and Berejikian (2007). As Marinov (2004, 2)
observes: “Since 1977, the use of economic pressure to further liberalization has increased
dramatically. Between 1985 and 2000, the number of countries subject to such pressure
increased fourfold ... the United States and European Union (EU) member states in particu-
lar, have been especially prominent in this rising trend. More than 85% of all sanctions for
democracy have been levied with the participation of either Europe or the U.S”. 
6 While all regions (with the exception of the Middle East) have experienced a marked rise
in the risk that autocracy will be sanctioned, substantial regional variation in the likelihood
of sanctioning exists. A Latin American country which experienced a lapse in democracy in
2000, Marinov writes, had a greater than 80% risk of being sanctioned by outsiders. 
7 As Judith Kelley (2004b, 425–6) observes, the body of theoretical and empirical research
on the use of democratic conditionality by international actors (as opposed to the struc-
tural adjustment conditionality policies of the IFIs) is sparse and until recently the strat-
egy had not been subjected to close analysis. See also Svensson (2000), showing that the
voluminous literature on foreign aid and development has generally not dealt with incen-
tive problems in the donor–recipient relationship, and credibility and institutional design
issues in foreign aid policy, in particular. 
8 The notion of “reinforcement by reward” is articulated by Schimmelfennig, Engert and
Knobel (2003, 496).
9 For the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) selection criteria see: http://
www.mcc.gov/selection/index.php. For commentary on the MCC see the series of papers
published by the Center for Global Development: http://www.cgdev.org/nv/
features_MCA.html. On the MCC see also: Soederberg (2004); Radelet (2003).
10 For an excellent summary of the literature on external incentives see: Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier (2005a). International lawyers have approached similar questions, 
but from the point of view of compliance with international rules and norms. See, in
particular, Hathaway (2002); (2005). 
11 Including corruption control, prominent court systems, civil service professionalization,
modern administrative practices, as well as environmental, educational and scientific poli-
cies. See, in particular, Meyer et al. (1997a); Ramirez, Drori, Meyer and Schofer (2003).
12 See Schraeder (2003).The international community’s swift and decisive verbal condemna-
tion of General Oviedo’s attempted military coup in Paraguay in April 1996, for instance,
played a pivotal role in castigating the military’s insubordination against civilian control
as normatively unacceptable, and bolstered the weak elected government, effectively
saving the country’s fragile democracy from collapse. On this case see Valenzuela (1997). 
13 These include: The Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights (CLAHR); The
European Committee on Legal Cooperation (CDCJ); The European Committee on Crime
Problems (CDPC); The Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO); The Committee of
Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER), and the European Commission on Democracy
Through Law (Venice Commission). Many of these activities are coordinated by the
Directorate General of Legal Affairs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (see: http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/default_en.asp)..
14 For a summary of existing indicators and the reasons for their rapid emergence 
in the last decade see: The World Bank: A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance:
governance matters 2006 (2006) (available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/1740479-1150402582357/266182 911580); Arndt
and Oman (2006); Munck and Verkuilen (2002).
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15 The privately-owned International Crisis Risk Guide (ICRG), for example, provides a politi-
cal risk assessment of 161 countries comprising, inter alia, contract viability and risk of prop-
erty expropriation, corruption, civilian control of the military, bureaucratic quality, as well as
strength and impartiality of the legal system. The ICRG is compiled by the PRS Group (see:
http://www.prsgroup.com/). Similarly, from the non-profit, NGO sector, Transparency
International (TI) and Freedom House (FH) produce the widely cited Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) and Freedom in the World index, respectively; ranking the vast majority of coun-
tries in the world on comparative scales, covering, inter alia, rule-of-law dimensions. Freedom
House’s measure of the degree to which “civil liberties” are protected in 192 countries, for
instance, includes four specific questions under the title “the rule of law” – asking whether
there is an independent judiciary, whether the rule of law prevails in civil and criminal
proceedings, if the police operates under civilian control, and if individuals are protected from
police terror, unjustified imprisonment, torture or exile. Among international institutions,
the World Bank produces two major sets of influential governance indicators, partly dedicated
to assessment of rule-of-law conditions in the monitored countries. The Country Policy
Institutions Assessments (CPIAs) – published by the Bank annually since 1977 but only
publicly disclosed from 2006 – cover 16 criteria, including business regulatory environment,
property rights, rules-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management,
quality of public administration, and transparency-accountability-corruption in the public
sector. More importantly still, since 1996 the World Bank Institute has produced the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (or “KKZ” indicators), which have become the most
widely quoted governance indicators by the media, academia, and the broader donor commu-
nity. For a critique of the way in which governance indicators are compiled and used see Arndt
and Oman (2006).
16 The EU has not been the sole example of this phenomenon. In a series of large-scale, ongo-
ing processes, the main international organizations of the transatlantic community – the
EU, NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE – have actively sought to transmit their
rules, institutions and norms, by combining membership conditionality and financial
assistance with engagement in a long-term, multilevel set of deliberative processes of vary-
ing content and density. Through the establishment of permanent links (such as the
Partnership for Peace, PFP, policy), joint training operations and monitoring, NATO, for
instance, has played an increasingly structured role in socializing military leaders in
Central and Eastern Europe to the idea of civilian control of the military, transparent 
security budgets and other modern regulatory standards. Foregoing the EU’s rigorous
architecture of membership conditionality, similarly, the Council of Europe and the OSCE
have opted primarily for a post-accession model of influence through socialization.
17 OAS General Assembly, Resolution 1062. 
18 For the text of the Inter-American Democratic Charter see: http://www.oas.org/
OASpage/eng/ Documents/ Democractic_Charter.htm. See the annual reports of the Inter-
American Juridical Committee (available at: http://www.oas.org/cji/eng/ reports_iajc.htm).
19 Preamble to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) (text available at:
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm). Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act
also states that the African Union shall act in accordance with the principle of: “Respect for
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”. 
20 Checkel (2005, 804) calls these two types of socialization “Type I” and “Type II”, respectively.
21 On this mechanism Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) developed a very effective empir-
ical analysis on 36 cases to show its salience. 
22 To reach such an understanding a detailed “country report” has been prepared on each
country. The template of the report is standard, covering: key facts and figures; historical
and political background with detailed post-Cold War coverage; an analysis of govern-
mental structure and practice (executive, legislative and judiciary); an analysis of demo-
cratic conditions (electoral processes, economic conditions, civil society, legacy and
conflict issues, protection of freedoms); as well as international factors (membership in
variety of international and regional organizations and fora, subscription to international
treaties and relationship with other major promoters, where applicable).
52 Leonardo Morlino and Amichai Magen
9780415451024-Ch02  4/16/08  7:05 PM  Page 52
